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Abstract 
In December 1994, Mexico entered a financial crisis after a year of political turmoil, 
assassinations of high-level politicians, and a substantial depreciation of the peso. In 1995, 
following the economic contraction, the recently privatized banking sector experienced 
difficulties in meeting regulatory minimum capital requirements. The Mexican government 
received a $52 billion international financial package and enacted multiple programs to 
support the banking system. In the spring of 1995, through the Bank Fund for Savings 
Protection (FOBAPROA), the Capitalization and Loan Purchase of Bank Portfolio Program 
(CLPP) was introduced to provide new, permanent capital to Mexican banks. For banks that 
were able to secure private recapitalizations, FOBAPROA acquired twice the amount in 
nonperforming loans. Between 1995 and 1996, 11 banks participated in the program, which 
purchased nonperforming assets with a book value of MXN 142 billion for MXN 119 billion 
($18.1 billion for $15.6 billion in end-1996 US dollars). By 1997, the Mexican financial system 
had stabilized, but the banking sector was still struggling when FOBAPROA was discontinued 
in 1999. The CLPP ameliorated the situation, but it remained a highly controversial program 
and some commentators were not sure whether it did enough to revive the Mexican 
economy. 




1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at   
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/. 
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management. 





At a Glance  
Mexico completed the privatization of its 
banking sector in 1992. The North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the US 
and Canada went into force in 1994, and 
foreign inflows increased substantially. The 
debt of Mexican banks to foreign banks 
increased from $8 billion in 1991 to $16.5 
billion in 1994. 
In December 1994, Mexico entered a 
financial crisis after a year of political 
turmoil, assassinations of high-level 
politicians, and a substantial depreciation of 
the peso. Mexican international reserves fell 
from $29 billion in February 1994 to 
$6 billion in December. 
As the economy contracted, recently 
privatized banks increased provisions for 
nonperforming loans (NPLs), pushing their 
capital below regulatory minimums. The 
government, the Bank of Mexico, the private 
sector, and labor groups initially responded 
by announcing a program on January 3, 
1995. The program, known as the 
Agreement of Unity to Overcome the 
Economic Emergency (in Spanish, Acuerdo 
de Unidad para Superar la Emergencia 
Económica), committed the government to 
austerity to allow Mexico to access an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-
By Arrangement and reassure foreign 
investors (GAO 1996, 134).  
Under the program, Mexico promised, 
among other things, that it would halve the 
ratio of its current account deficit to GDP, 
then at 8%, and lower annual inflation by 30% to around 9% by the end of 1995 (IMF 1995; 
IMF 1995a). It resolved to make good on these promises by way of an austerity budget, which 
projected a 0.5% of GDP fiscal surplus for 1995 (compared with a balanced position for 
1994) and a 3.4% primary surplus for 1995 (compared with 2.6% in 1994). The program 
also put the Bank of Mexico on the path to monetary tightening and cut credit expansion in 
the financial sector. The Bank of Mexico resolved to limit the growth of its net domestic 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To recapitalize solvent banks whose capital 
was below regulatory minimums due to the 
deterioration of their loan assets. 
 
Launch Dates   March 1995 
(Announcement), May 1995 
(Start of operations) 
Wind-Down Date No initial wind-down date, but 
FOBAPROA was dissolved in 
1999 
Size and Type of 
NPL Problem 
8.27% of all loans in the 
banking system in 1994 and 
27% of all loans as of 
September 1995. The loans 
appeared to be heterogeneous 
Program Size Not specified; contingent on 
amount of capital injected by 
shareholders (2 pesos of loans 
purchased per peso injected) 
Eligible Institutions Determined case by case by 
the National Banking and 
Securities Commission 
(CNBV). Eligibility contingent 
on injection of new capital by 
shareholders 
Usage Assets with a book value of 
MXN 142 billion purchased for 
MXN 119 billion 
Outcomes Estimated cost of MXN 97,000 
million, though improved 




Notable Features Loss-sharing and purchase 
based on provisioning for 
NPLs  
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assets to MXN 10 billion4 in 1995 (compared with MXN 60 billion in 1994). Development 
banks promised to cut their rate of credit expansion by over one half. The government also 
announced that it would recapitalize banks with capital ratios below the 8% minimum (IMF 
1995, 63). In return for austerity policies, the IMF agreed to provide a $17.8 billion rescue 
package (announced on January 26, 1995) and the US proposed a guarantee on Mexican 
sovereign debt (IMF 1995, 54–55). This was to be the largest Stand-By Arrangement in the 
history of the IMF (IMF 1995, 57). 
In February 1995, the government announced a temporary bank recapitalization program 
linked to the provision of liquidity and more stringent capital requirements5 (World Bank 
1995, 17). The liquidity program provided collateralized dollar loans to banks having trouble 
meeting their maturing obligations (GAO 1996, 144). The government introduced the 
Temporary Capitalization Program (PROCAPTE) in February 1995 (World Bank 1995, 50–
51, 98). Its objective was to temporarily capitalize banks that, owing to economic conditions, 
were unable to recapitalize themselves (Mackey 1999, 65; World Bank 1995, 50–51, 97. The 
temporary program aimed to signal financial markets that the Mexican government would 
support the banking system.  
On March 31, 1995, six banks received a total of $950 million in PROCAPTE capital 
(Bloomberg News 1995). To attract new private investors, the Mexican Congress also 
modified banking laws to allow foreign banks to take control of troubled domestic banks 
(World Bank 1998, 10). The main bank of concern was Bank Probursa, which had a risk-
weighted capital ratio of approximately 7.2% and a provisioning percentage for bad loans of 
48%. It was given two months to meet an 8% capital ratio target in anticipation of an 
agreement with the Spain’s Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV). BBV was already an important 
shareholder, owning 22% of Probursa stock. It offered to make a $200 million capital 
infusion to raise its stake above 50%, but the purchase could not occur without the removal 
of some NPLs from the bank (Bloomberg News 1995; Bloomberg News 1995a; MXBU 1995; 
World Bank 1995, 50–51).   
Markets understood these programs to be too limited in scope, and foreign capital continued 
to flee Mexico through March. The Mexican government announced an internationally 
backed comprehensive economic program on March 9 to stop capital flight and rehabilitate 
the financial system. To facilitate the permanent recapitalization of the banks and to allow 
BBV’s purchase of Bank Probursa to proceed, the Bank Fund for Savings Protection 
(FOBAPROA) introduced the Capitalization and Loan Purchase of Bank Portfolio Program 
(CLPP). FOBAPROA was Mexico’s equivalent to the United States’ Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), having been created in 1990 in the wake of Mexico’s last major round of 
debt restructuring (World Bank 1995, 96). It also could serve as a lender of last resort for 
banks.  
Under the CLPP, FOBAPROA incentivized the recapitalization of banks by their shareholders 
or other outside actors by purchasing 2 pesos in NPLs for each peso of new capital injections 
that shareholders brought in. FOBAPROA bought the nonperforming loans with 10-year, 
 
4 Exchange rate of March 31, 1995, was Mexican pesos (MXN) 6.82 = $1 USD (FRED 2020). 
5 On February 22, 1995, the National Banking and Securities Commission required banks to increase their 
provisions to the higher of: (a) 4% of the loan portfolio; or (b) 60% of nonperforming loans (NPLs); or (c) 
provisions required from quarterly loan classifications under previous rules. Multiple banks were unable to 
meet the regulatory capital target after increasing their provisions to meet this requirement (Mackey 1999, 
65). In early March 1995, the average reserves for NPLs were about 47.5% (WSJ 1995). 
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zero-coupon, nontransferable promissory notes at a discount equivalent to book value of the 
loan, minus any prior provisions for loan losses. 
Negotiated on a case-by-case basis with each bank, FOBAPROA and the banks shared 
responsibility for loan losses on the purchased NPLs. Under these loss-sharing 
arrangements, banks committed to pay 20%–30% of any losses FOBAPROA incurred on their 
NPLs after 10 years. Between 1995 and 1996, a total of 11 banks participated in three waves 
of asset purchases. FOBAPROA ultimately purchased nonperforming loans with a book value 
of MXN 142 billion for a price of MXN 119 billion (World Bank 1998, 4, 11). The CLPP 
delegated asset management responsibilities to the banks themselves, though there was a 
brief attempt to have FOBAPROA manage and dispose of the assets. See Figure 1 for 
approximate figures assembled from various sources; documentation on participation in the 
CLPP was limited, so there were data quality difficulties. 
Figure 1: FOBAPROA Capitalization and Loan Purchase of Bank Portfolio Program  
 
Bank 
% of Mexican 
Banking Assets Date 
Times FOBAPROA 
Acquired NPLs 
Amount in Mexican 
Pesos (MXN) 
Banamex 20% Dec. 1995 Once 28.6 billion for 23.0 billion 
Bancomer 17% Jan. 1996 Once 30.1 billion for 23.6 billion 
Serfin 12% June 1995 
Apr. 1996 
Twice 28.5 billion for 24.9 billion 
Atlantico 6% Sep. 1995 Twice 7.1 billion for 6.0 billion 
Mexicano 6% Unclear Once 8.4 billion for 6.9 billion 
Bital 5% June 1996 Twice 8.8 billion for 7.5 billion 
Banorte 2% Oct. 1995 Twice 4.1 billion for 3.6 billion 
Confia 2% Mar. 1996 Once 6.6 billion for 6.0 billion 
Promex 2% Sep. 1995 Twice 3.4 billion for 3.0 billion 
Bancrecer n/a Sep. 1995 
June 1996 
 15.4 billion for 14.0 billion 
Probursa n/a May 1995 
Jan. 1996 
July 1996 
Three times 9.3 billion for 7.6 billion 
 
Sources: Cypher 1996; Graf 1999; World Bank 1998, Annex A and B. 
On April 26, 1996, the government created a subsidiary of FOBAPROA called the Valuation 
and Sale of Assets (VVA), in order to sell the nonperforming loans FOBAPROA had acquired. 
The first trial asset auction was conducted in July 1997, and assets totaling approximately 
MXN 132 million6 were sold at an average of 50% of their nominal value (Graf 1999, 173; 
Mackey 1999, 49). 
 
6 Sources report different numbers: Graf (1999, 173) reports US$135 million, while the World Bank (1998, 16) 
reports MXN 132 million.  
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The VVA never became fully functional, and after the first trial auction in July 1997, it was 
disbanded7 and its responsibilities absorbed by FOBAPROA (Graf 1999, 173; World Bank 
1998, 16). There were multiple reasons for this liquidation: the VVA simply did not have the 
resources necessary to quickly and efficiently sell off assets; additionally, any asset sales 
completed “at less than their acquisition prices would begin to reveal the fiscal cost of the 
FOBAPROA loan purchase and recapitalization program” (World Bank 1998). Successful 
sales would also have revealed the amount of loss-sharing banks owed on their assets, and 
“‘fire sales’ of VVA assets might create benchmarks for valuing the assets remaining on 
banks’ books, with possible negative implications for capital adequacy” (World Bank 1998, 
16). 
Afterwards, some of the VVA’s responsibilities were assumed by the newly created 
FOBAPROA Recovery Sub-Committee. The Recovery Sub-Committee had two objectives: 
maximizing asset recovery on loans greater than MXN 50 million. 
In 1998, after intensive debates in the Mexican Congress, the government recognized the 
promissory notes issued by FOBAPROA as public debt. In early 1999, FOBAPROA’s assets 
were transferred to a new deposit insurance agency, the Bank Savings Protection Institute 
(IPAB). The government empowered IPAB to deal with failed banks’ assets (Calomiris, 
Klingebiel, and Laeven 2004, 37). 
Summary Evaluation 
By 1997, the Mexican financial system had stabilized, but the banking sector was still 
struggling when FOBAPROA was discontinued in 1999 (Honohan and Laeven 2005, 50–53). 
An independent audit report commissioned by the Mexican government concludes that 
FOBAPROA was “insufficient in dealing with the magnitude of the crisis due to resources 
available and allocated to the department by the Technical Committee, and this situation was 
not remedied until April of 1997” (Mackey 1999, 188). Even after this point, when the 
government replaced FOBAPROA’s management, it was difficult to alter existing processes 
in favor of best practices (Mackey 1999, 188). On a more positive note, Mackey notes that 
the Technical Committee (the decision-making body of the FOBAPROA trust, which had a 
significant role in the CLPP) generally “appeared to have operated in consideration of due 
process” (Mackey 1999, 183). 
The CLPP was the most controversial government program of the crisis. In fact, a 
MXN 700 million portion of the loans may have been acquired by FOBAPROA illegally, which 
created complaints about the perceived corruption of the institution (De Luna-Martinez 
2000, 38; Mackey 1999, 212–15). A small portion of the nonperforming loans accounted for 
a large share of the loans FOBAPROA purchased (Graf 1999, 172). A significant portion of the 
purchased loans also was made to Mexican corporations and households that were solvent 
(De Luna-Martinez 2000, 38). 
The World Bank states that although the CLPP attracted new capital, that did not prove to be 
enough, and the program missed opportunities to eliminate nonviable banks (1998). Banks 
may not have been incentivized to recover the loans purchased by FOBAPROA, since the final 
share of the losses could be less than the costs of recovery and banks were not necessarily 
motivated to play the role of debt collector (Graf 1999, 172). The World Bank also states that 
“estimates of the ultimate costs of steps taken by the government were imprecise due to the 
continued lack of reliable data on the condition and performance of assets acquired by 
 
7 Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2004) offer conflicting information: they write that the VVA was disbanded 
and merged with FOBAPROA in June 1997. 
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FOBAPROA, and . . . most private analysts expected the costs to exceed the government’s 
estimates” (World Bank 1998, 17–18). 
Other criticisms include the fact that banks were allowed to offer up their worst loans for 
purchase by FOBAPROA (Graf 1999, 172). Some critics also cite the decision to make 
FOBAPROA’s promissory notes nontransferable. Graf states that “the paper [could] not be 
sold, and [did] not accrue income flow (interest [was] capitalized), so banks became highly 
illiquid and profits remained weak” (Graf 1999, 172). Some commentators describe the asset 
transfer procedures as an opaque process that created perceptions that some banks were 
treated more favorably than others (Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven 2004, 36; Mulás 
2001). 
FOBAPROA casts a large shadow over Mexico’s post-1990 political economy (Calomiris, 
Klingebiel, and Laeven 2004, 37). Honohan and Laeven allege that the most important 
takeaway of FOBAPROA is that “political-economy factors can have an enormous impact on 
the success of government policies through the corruption of the recapitalization process, 
and that recapitalization and asset resolution programs per se do not encourage a restart of 
lending, especially in a country in which imprudent lending behavior and politically-
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Economic Context: Mexico, 1994–1995 
GDP 
$529.4 billion in 1994 
$357.8 billion in 1995 
GDP per capita 
$5,854 in 1994 
$3,928 in 1995 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt) 









Size of banking system 
$172.2 billion in total assets 
in 1994 
$119.5 billion in total assets 
in 1995 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
32.5% in 1994 
33.4% in 1995 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
N/A 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
~61% of total banking assets 
in 1995 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
4% of total banking assets in 
1994 
5% of total banking assets in 
1995 
Government ownership of banking system 53% in 1995 
Existence of deposit insurance 
1994: 100% of deposits and 
all bank liabilities (excepting 
subordinated debt) 
1995: 100% of deposits and 
all bank liabilities (excepting 
subordinated debt) 
Sources: Bloomberg; Cull, Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2018; Graff 1999; Haber and 
Musacchio 2013; Musacchio 2012. 
  
307
Mexico: FOBAPROA Capitalization and Loan Purchase of Bank Portfolio Program (CLPP) Leon Hoyos and Nye
Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: Mexican authorities established the CLPP under the Bank Fund 
for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA) as part of its internationally funded program 
to mitigate the effects of the peso crisis on the banking system. 
The Mexican government announced an internationally backed comprehensive economic 
program on March 9, 1995. Part of this program went toward FOBAPROA’s Capitalization 
and Loan Purchase of Bank Portfolio Program (CLPP).  
The headline components of the program elaborated the various austerity policies detailed 
in the Mexican government’s January 3, 1995, proposal, pairing it with enhanced 
international assistance. Under the arrangement, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
agreed to provide $17.8 billion in stand-by credit (including the already announced $7.8 
billion), the US would provide $20 billion, various central banks would provide $10 billion 
through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and various commercial banks would 
provide $3 billion. The program also strengthened the social safety net (World Bank 1995, 
2) and continued support for the Temporary Capitalization Program (PROCAPTE), the first 
government recapitalization, announced in February. 
The Mexican government also announced a program that restructured bank loans to small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on March 10, 1995. Under this program, the 
government and the Mexican Association of Bankers extended the maturities of existing 
loans up to 12 years, with the new loans being denominated in inflation-indexed units. A 
total of MXN 65 billion in SME loans were eligible, representing 12% of the country’s 
commercial bank loans (BBC Monitoring Service: Latin America 1995).   
2. Legal Authority: The Capitalization and Loan Purchase of Bank Portfolio Program 
was established using the legal authority associated with the 1990 creation of the 
FOBAPROA. 
The CLPP was established by FOBAPROA, which itself was created in 1990 as a trust under 
the administration of the Bank of Mexico. FOBAPROA served as a mechanism for providing 
preventive support to commercial banks and to protect savings. FOBAPROA was governed 
by Article 122 of the Credit Institutions Law (Ley de Instituciones de Crédito), the main 
statute governing banks’ activities (World Bank 1995, 96). It was the government agency 
responsible for dealing with bank insolvencies (Graf 1999, 170). It also provided bank 
restructuring, deposit insurance, insurance of other bank liabilities,8 and in some cases, 
lender of last resort services (World Bank 1995, 50).  
The CLPP itself did not involve a new or unique legal framework. FOBAPROA simply created 
the CLPP using the powers given to it by the Credit Institutions Law. FOBAPROA required 
that banks create trusts, transfer their interests in the designated loans to those trusts, and 
then set the beneficiary of the trusts to be FOBAPROA (Mackey 1999, 68). 
 
8 FOBAPROA went beyond simple deposit insurance. It provided a blanket guarantee of all unsubordinated 
liabilities of the commercial banks. This guarantee came into being in 1990. FOBAPROA had broad powers to 
extend credit to banks to permit them to meet their obligations to depositors and other liability holders (World 
Bank 1995, 16). 
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The Valuation and Sale of Assets (VVA) agency, another body created to deal with 
nonperforming loans (NPLs), also did not have a specialized legal framework. It was set up 
as a subsidiary of FOBAPROA under Article 122 (Graf 1999, 173). 
3. Special Powers: The CLPP and VVA had no special powers. 
Neither institution had special powers.  
4. Mandate (1): FOBAPROA’s CLPP was introduced in the spring of 1995 to provide 
permanent capital to solvent banks that were near or below minimum capital 
requirements due to weakening loan assets. 
The CLPP purchased NPLs from banks if they were able to raise private capital (Mackey 
1999, 22). 
FOBAPROA had a broader mandate. It provided a blanket guarantee for all unsubordinated 
bank liabilities, enforced bank restructuring, supervised banks, and provided liquidity as a 
lender of last resort (Graf 1999, 170; World Bank 1995, 16–17, 50, 96). Some of the 
FOBAPROA’s objectives, as outlined by the Ministry of Finance, included: limiting the risk of 
bank runs and preserving financial stability, protecting depositors and bank creditors, 
supporting the liquidity and solvency of institutions, minimizing fiscal costs by allocating 
them over time, and attracting foreign banks (Graf 1999; Mackey 1999, 27). 
Later studies argue that the division of responsibilities between the VVA and the rest of 
FOBAPROA was poorly defined, complicating their relationship (Calomiris, Klingebiel, and 
Laeven 2004, 36; Mulás 2001, 161). 
5. Mandate (2): The Mexican government established the VVA agency to administer 
and sell remaining assets from the CLPP. 
In April 1996, Mexican authorities established the Valuation and Sale of Assets agency. Its 
mandate had several components. First, it was to maximize the government’s return on 
FOBAPROA’s assets through the sale of said assets. Second, it was to develop strategies for 
selling the assets that would support the recovery of viable entities associated with the loans. 
Third, it was to encourage the Mexican economy to develop a secondary market for the sale 
of bank debt (Mackey 1999, 49–50). 
6. Communications: FOBAPROA did not appear to have a particular communications 
strategy, as a whole or under the CLPP. 
The organization did not appear to have an external communications strategy and did not 
release detailed reports for the public. It appeared to have issues related to limited 
communications between some of its own departments (Mackey 1999, 186). FOBAPROA 
appeared to publish very little, and the scope of said material appeared to be narrow. 
7. Ownership Structure: FOBAPROA was a trust set up by the Bank of Mexico and was 
thus government owned. 
The CLPP was an initiative by FOBAPROA, which itself was set up as a publicly owned and 
controlled entity (Graf 1999, 170).  
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8. Governance/Administration: FOBAPROA administered the CLPP. 
The CLPP did not have its own administrative apparatus; it was merely a program of 
FOBAPROA.  
The Bank of Mexico administered the daily operations of FOBAPROA. Meanwhile, 
FOBAPROA’s policy decisions were made by its nine-member Technical Committee. Four 
were from the Ministry of Finance, one of being the minister. Three were from the Bank of 
Mexico, one being the governor. And two were from the CNBV (the National Banking and 
Securities Commission, a dependency of the Ministry of Finance), one being the president. 
The chairman of the Technical Committee was from the Ministry of Finance and had the 
deciding vote (Mackey 1999, 20; World Bank 1995, 96). The CNBV was the only agency with 
complete access to bank information. It was mainly the CNBV, with assistance from 
FOBAPROA’s staff, that prepared the technical documents that set the foundation for many 
of the Technical Committee’s decisions. The Bank of Mexico acted as the trustee of 
FOBAPROA, responsible for carrying out the Technical Committee’s resolutions, and signed 
all agreements involving FOBAPROA’s financial assistance (Mackey 1999, 20). 
9. Size: FOBAPROA’s CLPP did not have a specified size, though 11 banks participated 
in the program.  
The size of the CLPP was entirely dependent on the extent to which each participating bank 
was able to attract new capital. For each peso a bank was able to attract in new equity 
(including mandatory convertible subordinated debt), FOBAPROA acquired an amount of 
NPLs roughly equal to 2 pesos. This diluted the interest in the bank represented by its 
original shares (World Bank 1998, 4). In the case the bank issued nonconvertible 
subordinated debentures, FOBAPROA acquired an equal amount of NPLs (Bank of Mexico 
1998, 157). 
Over the life of the program, between 1995 and 1996, new and committed capital in the form 
of equity and subordinated debt totaled MXN 63.3 billion (approximately $20 billion face 
value) (largely from existing shareholders and foreign financial institutions), and gross loan 
purchases by FOBAPROA totaled MXN 142 billion (MXN 119 billion net of reserves for loan 
losses) (World Bank 1998, 4, 11).9 An analysis in 1999 describes the face value of 
FOBAPROA’s assets growing from $11 billion in 1996 to $32 billion at the end of 1998. It also 
estimates the total cost of FOBAPROA’s banking rescue programs at between $55 billion and 
$65 billion (McQuerry 1999, 22). This included programs like a toll road bailout and various 
debtor rescue schemes. The loans sold to FOBAPROA represented approximately 30% of 
these banks’ total loans (Graf 1999, 172). 
10. Funding Source: FOBAPROA was financed by monthly contributions from banks 
based on their liabilities. It could borrow from the Ministry of Finance and the 
Bank of Mexico. 
FOBAPROA’s operations were financed by monthly contributions from banks set at between 
0.3% and 0.5% of their liabilities (though it could be raised to 0.7% in extraordinary 
situations). It could borrow from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Mexico (World 
Bank 1995, 50, 96).  
 
9 At 1996 year-end, the total net value was MXN 119.3 billion (MXN 141.9 billion gross value). With the CLPP, 
bank capital increased by 158% from its December 1994 level (Bank of Mexico 1997, 136). 
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FOBAPROA’s NPL purchases under the CLPP were funded through the issuance of 10-year 
nontradable, zero-coupon promissory notes backed by the Mexican government. These 
promissory notes did not initially count as public debt on the Mexican government’s balance 
sheet (Graf 1999, 171–72), and the issuance of these notes had no effect on the monetary 
base (Bank of Mexico 1998, 157). The interest rate on the notes was below normal lending 
rates. When denominated in pesos, the interest rate was equal to that of the three-month 
Treasury bill. When denominated in US dollars, the interest rate was equal to the London 
interbank offered rate plus 400 basis points (Graf 1999, 171).  
11. Eligible Institutions: Mexican authorities decided eligibility on a case-by-case 
basis. 
The CNBV determined on a case-by-case basis if a bank’s management was adequate to be 
eligible. Only in exceptional cases were changes in management and control required. 
Shareholders had to show significant financial commitment, and the bank had to undergo a 
management audit by an independent accounting firm and commit to improve its 
management, systems, and internal controls (World Bank 1998, 11). 
FOBAPROA negotiated participation limits with each bank individually. Banks entered the 
CLPP by way of an agreement with FOBAPROA.  
Overall, banks met the capital commitments stipulated in their agreements to enter the CLPP. 
When a bank failed to meet this requirement, FOBAPROA provided extensions or allowed 
minor shortfalls, based on market conditions in the particular case. If a bank failed to meet 
the requirement significantly, it was subject to further capitalization under the government’s 
Intervention and Rehabilitation program. Loans to be excluded or disclosed (under the first 
round of agreements) were in fact correctly excluded or disclosed, with only minor gaps in 
reserve determinations (Mackey 1999, 192). 
Shareholders did not always completely fulfill the requirement to inject capital. Either they 
could not obtain the funds (or could not by a given deadline), or the sources were not 
acceptable by the program rules (Mackey 1999, 193). 
The CLPP was originally designed to facilitate Banco Bilbao Vizcaya’s acquisition of Bank 
Probursa. However, other Mexican banks, given their poor financial conditions, requested to 
be included in this mechanism to raise their capitalization levels. Therefore, the CLPP was 
extended to stronger banks to avoid competitive disadvantages among private banks (World 
Bank 1998, Annex E, 10). Eventually, 11 banks participated in the program (see Figure 1).  
A number of banks also participated in the program more than once. 
12. Eligible Assets: Banks could decide which loans FOBAPROA acquired. 
Banks were able to select the worst loans for transfer and purchase (Graf 1999, 172–73). 
When the first program was instituted, the following loans were not accepted in the CLPP: 
“(a) loans rated ‘E’ (loans past due); (b) loans held by companies in bankruptcy or 
suspension of payments; (c) loans discounted with development institutions; (d) loans 
denominated in inflation-linked currency units (UDIs); and (e) related party loans” (Mackey 
1999, 70). 
Financial authorities did not anticipate the magnitude of the crisis and the challenges in 
implementing the CLPP. As the condition of the commercial banks worsened, the Technical 
Committee modified its criteria to accept loans that had been previously excluded. 
Amendments were made to the first round of loan purchases, and variations were negotiated 
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with each bank. These amendments retroactively impacted the first round of asset purchases 
(both the assets selected and the terms under which said assets were purchased). As a result, 
differing results occurred at each bank. The process for the second round was adjusted to 
prevent this from happening again (Mackey 1999, 70–71). As part of these liberalized rules, 
FOBAPROA acquired interests in the loans of related parties, which might have created a 
perception that certain politically connected debtors received favorable treatment. CNBV 
and FOBAPROA wrote that no loans to controlling shareholders had been accepted in the 
purchased portfolios (Mackey 1999, 192). 
When the Technical Committee realized that the economic recovery was proceeding more 
slowly than expected, it decided to modify the program guidelines that excluded certain 
types of loans from the portfolio purchases (Mackey 1999, 192). 
At the program’s peak, FOBAPROA owned more than 50% of the loans in the Mexican 
banking system. Many of the assets that were eventually transferred to FOBAPROA were 
corporate and politically connected loans, making them difficult to resolve (Calomiris, 
Klingebiel, and Laeven 2004, 36; Mulás 2001, 161–62). 
Guillermo Rosas, a political science professor at Washington University in St. Louis, mentions 
that “bank managers . . . transferred their worst portfolio to FOBAPROA, which ended up 
paying hefty amounts for worthless assets . . .” (Rosas 2009, 74). 
13. Acquisition (Pricing 1): Under the CLPP, FOBAPROA acquired NPLs at above-
market value. 
This was the net book value (book value minus provisions for loan losses). The CNBV set the 
criteria for loan valuation as well as the appropriately reserved values (or fair value) 
(Mackey 1999, 70–71). 
External auditors, FOBAPROA, and the CNBV had 90 days to value and accept loans. Due to 
the vast amount of loans in the purchased portfolios, this timeframe was impractical (Mackey 
1999, 192). As a result, there were many delays and the initial asset purchases took two years 
to complete (Mackey 1999, 192–93).  
During the second round of purchases, FOBAPROA and the CNBV redirected the work of 
external auditors away from valuation. The external auditors now worked on verifying the 
existence and validity of loans instead. FOBAPROA now largely valued the assets based on 
criteria set by the CNBV (Mackey 1999, 71). 
14. Acquisition (Pricing 2): FOBAPROA negotiated loss-sharing agreements with each 
participating bank; these agreements were eventually backed by the building up 
of FOBAPROA-required “loss-sharing reserves” in participant banks. 
The loss-sharing arrangements were made on a case-by-case basis. Banks generally were 
responsible for between 20% and 30% of the liability coming from the sum not collected 
from a bank’s acquired NPLs when the FOBAPROA promissory notes matured (after 10 
years) (Bank of Mexico 1998; Graf 1999; OECD 1998, 84). The government covered the 
remainder of this loss.  
FOBAPROA set up the loss-sharing arrangements to reduce the moral hazard associated with 
the CLPP and with the fact that banks were largely expected to manage their own former 
assets for the benefit of FOBAPROA (World Bank 1998, Annex E, 9). 
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Under agreements with FOBAPROA, banks agreed to set aside loan-loss reserves to reflect 
the losses they expected to incur under the loss-sharing arrangements. However, following 
a review of the first round of CLPP purchases (which took place over the course of 1995), 
FOBAPROA and the CNBV found that some banks would not be able to meet minimum capital 
ratio requirements if they set aside reserves based on the methodology used in the 
agreements (Mackey 1999, 71). The three groups (FOBAPROA, CNBV, and the banks) then 
entered into negotiations to modify their agreements. These modifications sought to lower 
the authorities’ loan-loss reserve expectations (Mackey 1999, 71).  
In 1998, the Mexican authorities were concerned that banks had not set aside sufficient loan-
loss reserves to cover losses they were likely to bear under the FOBAPROA loss-sharing 
arrangements (Mackey 1999, 71). They noticed that the participating banks had not been 
revising the value of the loans bought by the trusts under CLPP in spite of a requirement to 
do so quarterly (Mackey 1999, 185). On February 25, 1998, the Mexican authorities ordered 
the banks to establish “loss-sharing reserves,” instructing them either to create contingent 
reserves on “a straight line basis over a term of eight years from July 1, 1998, or to establish 
these reserves over ten years from the start of the program at the bank” (Mackey 1999, 71). 
The specific motivation for this order, beyond improving provisioning, is not known. 
The CLPP also integrated incentives allowing any value collected by banks on the loans 
beyond the value of the bonds the banks received from FOBAPROA to be kept by the banks 
(OECD 1998, 84). 
15. Acquisition (Mechanics): FOBAPROA acquired its interest in transferred NPLs by 
becoming the beneficiary of trusts that acquired interests in the cash flows of 
NPLs. 
FOBAPROA itself did not directly acquire the NPLs. FOBAPROA issued 10-year nontradable 
promissory notes backed by the Mexican government as consideration for the NPLs. 
However, the NPLs themselves remained with the banks. Instead, trusts, under which 
FOBAPROA would be the beneficiary, acquired interests in the cash flows of the NPLs. As the 
banks collected on the loans, the proceeds flowed to the trust, which then used the funds to 
pay off the promissory notes (Mackey 1999, 69). 
The NPL purchases were carried out in two rounds. The first began in 1995, and the second 
began in 1996. Due to several problems, none of the purchases in the first round were closed 
or completed until the summer of 1997 (Mackey 1999, 70, 192). First, banks were unable, in 
some instances, to meet informational requirements as bank information systems could not 
supply relevant information. Second, the time period set for external auditors, FOBAPROA, 
and CNBV to value and accept loans was 90 days. This proved to be an unrealistically short 
period. 
The situation of some banks did not improve after a first round agreement with FOBAPROA, 
and they had to sell additional loans in a second round (Graf 1999, 172). In this second round, 
FOBAPROA simplified the process for setting loan values. FOBAPROA and CNBV now 
directed its external auditors to spend their time verifying the existence and validity of loans 
rather than working on valuation. Valuation now largely took place based on CNBV criteria, 
and banks were to modify their reserves according to these valuations (Mackey 1999, 71). 
Even though most of the privatized banks required this facility more than once, the program 
was not envisioned to be an open window facility, where banks could return to the program 
as needed (World Bank 1998, Annex E, 10).  
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16. Disposal (1): FOBAPROA initially left management and disposal of CLPP assets to 
participating banks but ultimately attempted to develop a more centralized asset 
disposal strategy. 
Banks that participated in the CLPP remained responsible for managing and disposing of the 
assets purchased in the program. FOBAPROA technically only purchased an interest in the 
proceeds of these loans, and title for the loans remained with the banks. The program built 
in incentives for banks to fulfill this role. First, the CLPP allowed banks to repurchase their 
loans. The program was structured so that any value collected by banks on the loans beyond 
the value of the bonds the banks received from FOBAPROA could be kept by the banks. 
Second, if NPLs produced losses, banks shared in them. Finally, the coupon banks received 
from the FOBAPROA bonds was less than the banks’ funding costs. FOBAPROA bonds were 
not liquid, incentivizing banks to complete asset disposals (OECD 1998, 84). 
FOBAPROA created the Central Credit Committee (CCC) in late 1996 to coordinate collection 
and restructuring efforts among the trusts holding interests in the NPLs and the various 
participants in the CLPP. The CCC participated in various mediation and corporate debt-
restructuring efforts going on in the Mexican economy at the time (Mulás 2001, 161–62). 
Later, FOBAPROA created the VVA. The VVA was meant to manage and sell FOBAPROA 
assets in an attempt at improving the secondary market for NPLs, reducing FOBAPROA’s 
stock of assets, and reducing FOBAPROA’s fiscal costs (Bank of Mexico 1997, 137). The 
Mexican government created the VVA following discussions between the Mexican 
authorities, World Bank staff, and consultants in early 1996 (World Bank 1998, 16). Under 
the VVA, loan documentation remained with the banks that managed or held the actual loans. 
This made the due diligence process exceedingly complex and lengthy (Calomiris, Klingebiel, 
and Laeven 2004, 36; Mulás 2001).  
The VVA conducted its first and only auction in July 1997 and was liquidated one month later 
(Bank of Mexico 1998, 158). This auction was small, with a face amount of MXN 132 million, 
and the VVA’s work was absorbed into FOBAPROA afterwards.10 Some reports attribute the 
failure of the VVA and the limited demand for its auction to the politically connected assets 
owned by FOBAPROA being “difficult to resolve for a government agency susceptible to 
political pressure” while subject to “substantial deficiencies in the bankruptcy and 
foreclosure code that limited VVA’s ability to bring debtors to the negotiation table”  
(Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven 2004, 37). 
That being said, even after FOBAPROA absorbed the VVA, only 0.5% of the total assets 
transferred under the FOBAPROA program were sold, with an average asset recovery rate of 
only 15% by 2004 (Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven 2004, 37). The VVA made attempts at 
 
10 In addition to the fact that it only performed one auction, the VVA took a long time to prepare for asset sales. 
It had institutional capacity problems as well as structural problems. Policymakers worried that prices on the 
asset sales would be less than their acquisition prices. This would reveal the fiscal cost of the CLPP activities 
and the likely amount of loss sharing for the banks, forcing their recognition. These asset sales might also 
“create benchmarks for valuing the assets remaining on banks’ books, with possible negative implications for 
capital adequacy” (World Bank 1998, 16). Mexican authorities later denied that the lengthy time for asset sales 
was a tactic to delay or outright avoid a public understanding of the CLPP’s actual cost to the state. A World 
Bank document states that the Mexican authorities consistently disclosed their estimations of the fiscal cost 
and indicates that there was no reason for not disclosing this information to the public (World Bank 1998, 
Annex E, 16). 
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securing ownership of loans, but the extent that it did so is unclear. This may have been due 
to some of the negative incentives that came along with ownership.  
Although VVA’s ownership of the loans would have allowed for a less difficult sale process, 
VVA’s purchase of the loans would have a negative impact on FOBAPROA. This is because if 
VVA, a subsidiary of FOBAPROA, became owner of these loans, the banks would no longer be 
subject to the various loss-sharing measures (Mackey 1999, 50). It was intended that the 
VVA would directly acquire and then sell loans, but the VVA never progressed past a pilot. 
Because the VVA was never fully operational, direct ownership of most of the loans did not 
happen. 
FOBAPROA also carried on some of VVA’s functions via the FOBAPROA Recovery Sub-
Committee, which aimed to maximize asset recoveries on loans greater than MXN 50 million. 
This sub-committee tried to do this by “presenting policies and recommending initiatives to 
improve collections” (Mackey 1999, 184). FOBAPROA accepted these recommendations. 
However, “suggestions regarding audits of the banks’ administrative capabilities, resource 
issues within the banks and deficiencies in bank information systems were not followed up 
on a timely basis” (Mackey 1999, 184). This tracks with FOBAPROA’s strategy around this 
time, which aimed to retain title and manage the largest assets in its portfolio. It is not clear, 
however, the extent to which FOBAPROA was successful in securing ownership of the loans 
(thus retaining title). FOBAPROA established a Corporate Assets Division to do this. 
Meanwhile banks would continue to manage a large portion of loans that were less than $7 
million for the benefit of FOBAPROA (to clarify, $7 million US dollars) (World Bank 1998, 
16). The Corporate Assets Division largely disposed of assets by way of auctions, which had 
limited success. Between Mexico’s lack of a secondary market for NPLs, the political nature 
of some loans, and a system of creditor-debtor law in need of updating, FOBAPROA still had 
a difficult time selling its assets.  
17. Disposal (2): The government initially restricted FOBAPROA, the VVA, or 
institutions that acquired NPLs from the VVA from foreclosing on acquired assets 
until the body in question acquired direct ownership of the NPLs. 
Initially, the original bank that sold the assets remained the legal owner of the loans. For that 
reason, FOBAPROA, the VVA, and institutions that acquired NPLs from them could not 
foreclose on acquired assets (Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven 2004, 36). Later in 
FOBAPROA’s history, the banks, the VVA, or FOBAPROA attempted to purchase the assets 
from the banks, making foreclosure possible. 
18. Timeframe: A specific timeframe was not envisioned for the CLPP’s existence or 
for the public’s interest in the NPLs acquired using the CLPP. 
Even though most of the privatized banks used the CLPP more than once, the program was 
not designed as a permanent open window facility for banks. Also, it was public knowledge 
that the closing date for purchases under CLPP was December 1996 (World Bank 1998, 
Annex E, 10).  
FOBAPROA’s work with the various NPLs it purchased did not have a definite wind-down 
date. However, FOBAPROA itself was dissolved in 1999, and its assets were transferred to a 
new deposit insurance agency, the Bank Savings Protection Institute (IPAB) (Calomiris, 
Klingebiel, and Laeven 2004, 37). 
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